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BY MANY  STANDARDS  inflation  has been a "surprise"  during  the past six 
years.  Errors  in forecasting  inflation  have increased  markedly  compared 
with earlier  periods.  For instance,  during  the interval  1971:3 to 1975:4 
the root mean-square  error  of the Livingston  panel of economists  in fore- 
casting  the consumer  price index six months ahead was 3.5 percentage 
points  at an annual  rate,  compared  with an error  of 1.6 percentage  points 
over  the previous  seventeen  years.'  Not only did the panel  forecasters  fail 
to predict  the increased  variance  of the inflation  rate  in the 1970s, but also 
they  fell far short  in predicting  the cumulative  total price  change  between 
1971 and 1976-24.0  percent  compared  with the actual  change  of 34.0 
percent.2  Most of the error  occurred  during  the four quarters  of 1974, 
Note: This research  has been supported  by the National Science Foundation.  I am 
grateful to my research assistant,  Joseph Peek, for his superb efficiency  in compiling 
and creating  the complex data base on which the paper depends.  Helpful suggestions 
were received from participants  in seminars  at Northwestern,  the University of Cali- 
fornia at Berkeley,  and the Federal Reserve  Banks  of San Francisco and Philadelphia. 
1. The Livingston forecasts were obtained from John A. Carlson, "A Study of 
Price Forecasts,"  Annals of Economic and Social Measurement,  vol. 6 (Winter  1977), 
table 1, pp. 33-34. I calculated  the errors  by comparing  the six-month-ahead  forecasts 
with the change in the consumer price index in the two relevant quarters. For in- 
stance, Carlson's calculation of  the predicted quarterly rate of  change between 
December 1973 and June 1974 is compared  with the average  quarterly  rate of change 
of the CPI in the first and second quarters  of 1974. The "previous  seventeen years" 
runs from 1954:1 to 1971:2. 
2.  The actual figure refers to the sum of the quarterly  rates of change of the CPI 
in the interval 1971:3 through 1976:2. The forecast figure is the sum of the six- 
month predicted  changes calculated by Carlson from the Livingston panel data for 
the ten surveys between June 1971 and December 1975. 
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with an actual  increase  of 11.6 percent,  almost  twice the 6.0 percent  in- 
crease  forecast  six months  in advance.3 
In searching  for an explanation  for this inflation,  this paper can be 
likened to an investigative  report  following a railroad  or airline crash. 
The news of the disaster-in  this case, the failure to forecast  inflation 
accurately-was reported  long ago and by now is well known.  But what 
can we say beyond  the fact that  the disaster  occurred?  Just as transporta- 
tion investigations  attempt  to determine  which specific  parts of the ma- 
chine  failed,  and  to recommend  improvements,  so here  the relationship  of 
the inflation  rate  to other  important  economic  variables  is studied  to de- 
termine  as precisely  as possible  what was different  about  the experience 
of the 1970s, and  what  lessons  can be learned  from  past mistakes.  Which 
theories and structural  relationships  relevant for predicting inflation 
remain  intact, and which require  surgery  or euthanasia?  What are the 
implications  for policy? 
Most econometric  models base their inflation  forecasts  on structural 
price  and  wage  equations,  either  a single  pair  for the aggregate  economy, 
or a larger  set of disaggregated  equations.  In my own past work  on infla- 
tion, I have specified  and estimated  aggregate  price and wage equations, 
and  have  studied  the sensitivity  of the results  to alternative  specifications, 
estimation  methods,  and sample  periods.  This paper  investigates  the per- 
formance  of my price-wage  model in tracking  the inflation  of the 1970s, 
and studies the implications  of its successes  and failures  for the future 
conduct  of economic policy. 
The paper  is divided  into three  sections,  one on the price  equation,  one 
on the wage equation,  and one on dynamic  simulations  in which  the two 
equations  interact. 
1. Structural  price equation. An equation  that explains  price change 
with wage change  as a predetermined  variable  is a component  of almost 
all large-scale  econometric  models of the U.S. economy. In a previous 
paper  I argued  that the total increase  in prices  relative  to wages  between 
mid-1971 and late 1975 was almost  exactly  what would have been pre- 
dicted by a structural  price equation  fitted to the 1954-71 period, and 
3.  The errors for the forecasts from five large-scale  models compiled by McNees 
were similar. The four-quarter-ahead  forecast made in 1973:4 for the change in the 
GNP deflator to 1974:4 was 6.04 percent; the actual was 11.04 percent. See the re- 
vised reprint  of Stephen  K. McNees, "An Evaluation of Economic Forecasts: Exten- 
sion  and Update," New  England Economic Review  (September/October 1976), 
pp. 30-44. Robert  J. Gordon  255 
that the timing  of postsample  errors  was consistent  with the hypothesis 
that prices had been held down by controls in 1971-72  and then re- 
bounded  when  controls  were  terminated  in 1974.4  This  paper  extends  this 
test through  the end of 1976, notes the effects  of recent  data  revisions  on 
the original  price equation,  and explores alternative  explanations  of its 
overprediction  of price  change  in 1975 and 1976. 
2. Structural  wage equation. Can a wage equation  specified  in 1971 
and estimated  for pre-1971 data explain the behavior  of wage change 
since 1971? What  was the impact  of 1973-74 "supply  shocks"  on wage 
change,  and how should policy respond  to future supply shocks?5  Has 
high  unemployment  during  1975 and 1976 held down  wage increases  by 
more  or less than  would  have  been expected  on the basis  of pre-1971  rela- 
tionships?  Finally, can the pre-1971 data or the 1971-76  experience 
distinguish  among  the various  proxies  for labor  market  tightness  used by 
different  econometric  investigators?" 
3. Dynamic simulations.  How potent are high unemployment  and 
a slack  economy  in slowing  the inflation  rate?  What  would  have been the 
consequences  for inflation  of an alternative  expansionary  policy in 1974? 
Is the Carter  administration's  planned  economic  recovery  consistent  with 
its goal of decelerating  inflation?  A dynamic  simulation  in which  the price 
and  wage  equations  interact  can provide  answers  to these questions. 
Behavior  of the Main  Variables,  1969-76 
Table 1 displays  the behavior  over the 1969-76 period  of several  im- 
portant  measures  of changes  in prices,  wages, money, and nominal  de- 
mand.  The figures  are annual  rates  of change.  The first  column  covers  the 
ten quarters  prior  to the imposition  of the controls  program  in 1971, the 
second column covers the two quarters  influenced  by the 1971 freeze, 
and  the next  five  columns  show  for the five  years 1972-76 the sum  of the 
quarterly  rates  of change  for the four quarters  of each year. 
The official  price indexes displayed  in the first four lines uniformly 
4.  Robert J. Gordon, "The Impact of  Aggregate Demand on Prices," BPEA, 
3:1975, pp. 613-62. 
5.  See Robert J. Gordon, "Alternative  Responses of Policy to External Supply 
Shocks,"  BPEA, 1:1975, pp. 183-204. 
6.  Robert J. Gordon, "Inflation  in Recession and Recovery,"  BPEA, 1:1971, pp. 
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record  little price  change  in late 1971 and 1972, double-digit  inflation  in 
1974, and  a return  in 1976 to rates  similar  to or below  those of 1969-71. 
The fifth line displays  the "nonfood,  net of energy"  deflator  that I de- 
veloped  earlier,  as recomputed  from  the revised  national  income  accounts 
and  extended  to the end  of 1976.7  This index  misses  double-digit  infation 
in 1974 by only a hair. 
Two wage indexes are displayed  next. The first is compensation  per 
manhour,  with an adjustment  for overtime  and shifts  in the interindustry 
employment  mix;  this is used as an independent  variable  in the structural 
price  equation.  The second  is the official  index  of adjusted  hourly  earnings 
compiled  by the Bureau  of Labor  Statistics,  further  adjusted  here to in- 
clude  fringe  benefits;  this is the dependent  variable  in the wage equation. 
The most notable  difference  between  wage and price behavior  over this 
period  has  been  the lower  variability  of wage  change-less  slowdown  dur- 
ing late 1971 and 1972, less acceleration  in 1974, and less deceleration 
between  1974 and 1976. As in the case of prices,  wage change  in 1976 
returned  to roughly  the same  rate as in 1969-71-a  bit higher  for com- 
pensation,  and a bit lower for average  hourly  earnings. 
The final section  of the table displays  the growth  of final  demand  and 
two measures  of the money  supply.  In none of these  was growth  nearly  as 
variable  as price  change.  The difference  between  the minimum  and  maxi- 
mum annual  rates of change  in the 1972-76 period  was 2.4 percentage 
points  for demand,  3.8 for M1,  3.3 for M2,  but 6.9 for the GNP deflator 
and 8.2 for the CPI. Simple reduced-form  regressions  in which price 
change  is regressed  on a distributed  lag of past  changes  in money  or final 
sales confirm  that virtually  none of the variance  of inflation  in the 1970s 
can  be attributed  to the behavior  of money  or final  sales.  When  estimated 
for 1954-71, and extrapolated  to 1976, such reduced-form  regressions 
can explain at most one-sixth  of the acceleration  of inflation  from the 
5 percent  range  in 1969-71 to double  digits  in 1974, and the subsequent 
deceleration  back  to 5 percent  in 1976. 
Structural  Price  Equations 
In an earlier  paper I  estimated  structural  price equations  that ex- 
hibited relatively strong effects of  aggregate demand on  the  price 
7.  Gordon, "Impact  of Aggregate  Demand,"  pp. 622-29, 656-60. 258  Brookings  Papers  on Economic Activity, 1:1977 
"markup,"  that is, on the relationship  of the aggregate  price level to the 
aggregate  wage level. These equations appeared able to  explain the 
cumulative  1971-75 inflation  using  coefficients  estimated  through  1971:2. 
Although  the postsample  prediction  errors  were large, their timing was 
consistent  with the interpretation  that the controls  had temporarily  held 
down  the price  level. In table  2, the first  column  lists the coefficients  of a 
version  of the "core"  equation  as published  in 1975.8 
The specification  of the various  price equations  presented  in table 2 
corresponds  to that  derived  in my 1975 paper.  The  price  level net of excise 
and sales  taxes  is marked  up over total cost by a margin  that depends  on 
the level of excess  demand  for commodities.  Total cost in turn  consists  of 
unit labor  cost, materials  prices,  and the user cost of capital.  After each 
variable  is transformed  into a percentage  rate of change,  and when tech- 
nical  change  is assumed  to be labor-augmenting,  an equation  is derived  in 
which  the rate  of change  of prices  depends  on each of the variables  listed 
in table 2: (1)  the rate of change  of an excise-tax  term; (2) the rate of 
change  of the relative  price  of materials;  (3)  the deviation  of the growth 
rate  of actual  productivity  from  its trend;  (4)  the rate  of change  of wages 
minus  the trend  growth  rate  of productivity-"trend  unit  labor  cost"; (5) 
the rate of change  of the relative  price  of capital  goods; and (6)  a proxy 
for the excess demand  for commodities,  either  the rate of change  of the 
ratio  of unfilied  orders  to capacity  (UFO/C), or the rate of change  of the 
gap  between  actual  and  potential  output. 
While in the earlier paper equations including the two alternative 
proxies  were  essentially  identical,  the same  cannot  be said  of the equations 
reestimated  with  new data  from  the 1976 revision  of the national  income 
accounts.  The data revisions  reduce the statistical  significance  of most 
variables when either demand proxy is  used, but the version using 
UFO/C is affected  most adversely  (compare  columns  2 and 3). The out- 
put-gap  equation  is superior  on almost  every  count,  with  a lower  standard 
error  of estimate  and  higher  t ratios  on every  independent  variable. 
In contrast  to the initial  core equation,  which tracked  the cumulative 
postsample  price change  very closely, both of the new equations  in col- 
umns 2 and 3 overpredict  inflation  during 1971-76 very substantially. 
The problem  is not that inflation  has been mysteriously  low over the 
five-year  extrapolation  interval,  but rather  that  the sum of coefficients  on 
8.  See ibid., pp. 634-35,  for the equations, and p. 639 for an illustration  of the 
prediction  errors  of one equation. Robert  J. Gordon  259 
labor cost (line 4)  is so far above 1.0 that a significant  overprediction 
builds  up. The same  cumulative  postsample  overprediction  is exhibited  in 
column  4, where  both  demand  variables  are excluded.  An interesting  fea- 
ture  of the  no-demand  version  is the higher  coefficient  on materials  prices, 
which  in the postsample  extrapolation  captures  more  of the 1974 upsurge 
in prices and allows the equation to achieve a lower postsample  root 
mean-square  error.  But the higher  coefficient  on materials  prices  adds  to 
the overprediction  of the equation  in column  4, offsetting  the lower co- 
efficient  on labor  cost. 
The postsample  performance  of the best equation-that in column 3 
-is  markedly  improved  when the sum of coefficients  on labor cost is 
constrained  to equal precisely 1.0. The constrained  equation  in column 
5 fits  the sample  period  about  as well as the unconstrained  version.  While 
the root mean-square  extrapolation  error  is only slightly  improved  in the 
constrained  version, the cumulative  overprediction  disappears. 
The actual  change  in the deflator  for nonfood  product  net of energy  and 
the predicted  value from the constrained  equation  of column 5 are dis- 
played in figure 1. A comparison  of the curve marked  "actual"  (solid 
line) and that labeled "fitted  values (1954:2-1971:2  sample period)" 
(dotted line) reveals  that the equation  underpredicts  inflation  at the end 
of its sample  period  in early 1971, but then overpredicts  in late 1971 and 
throughout  1972 by a cumulative  2.44 percentage  points. If interpreted 
as a measure  of the effect  of the controls  program,  that figure  lies at the 
low end  of the  range  estimated  in my  previous  papers. 
Next, the cumulative  underprediction  error  in the two years  ending  in 
1975:1 is 6.13 percentage  points, more than double the 1971-72 over- 
prediction.  That finding  is not consistent  with my previous  interpretation 
that all of the 1973-75 underprediction  can be attributed  to the effect  of 
the unwinding  of controls. A more plausible  interpretation  is that the 
equation  goes astray by exaggerating  the lag between wage and price 
changes  in an abnormal  period in which firms  recognized  that controls 
had  ended  and  reacted  to postcontrol  wage  increases  by passing  them  for- 
ward  to customers  much  faster  than  they  normally  would  have done. 
A final  puzzle  is why the inflation  rate  in 1976 was consistently  below 
the prediction  of the equations-in figure  1 the cumulative  overprediction 
is 0.92 percent.  One way to isolate any recent change  is to examine  the 
predictions  of a similar  structural  price  equation  reestimated  through  the 
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Column  6 in table 2 reports  the coefficients  of the extended  equation. 
The effect of price controls  is captured  by two dummy  variables,  one 
covering  the six-quarter  interval  beginning  in 1971:3, and the second 
covering  the four-quarter  interval  beginning  in 1974:2. The coefficients 
of the dummy  variables  are highly significant  and cumulate  to a value 
of -1.98  percent  of the controls  period  and + 2.04 for the postcontrols 
rebound  (there  is no constraint  imposed  to force these cumulative  totals 
to equal  each  other). 
Column  7 amends  column  6 by constraining  the sum  of the coefficients 
on trend  unit  labor  cost to equal 1.0. To highlight  the differing  time  paths 
of the two sets of predictions,  based on columns 5 and 7, respectively, 
fitted  values  for the extended  equation  are displayed  in figure  1 with the 
impact  of the dummy  variables  excluded.  The major  differences  occur  in 
the 1973-75 period,  when the extended  equation  does a much  better  job 
of capturing  the timing  of the acceleration  and  subsequent  deceleration  of 
inflation.  This performance  is achieved by three shifts in coefficients 
when the equation  is extended.  First, the coefficients  on labor cost shift 
sufficiently  to reduce  the mean lag by 1.6 quarters.9  This allows more of 
the postcontrols,  1974 bulge in wage change to influence  price change 
in 1974, rather  than in 1975. Second,  the coefficient  on materials  prices 
is higher,  which raises predicted  inflation  in 1973-74 while reducing  it 
in 1975. Third,  the coefficient  on current  productivity  change  is higher, 
allowing the negative values of productivity  change in late 1973 and 
throughout  1974 to boost predicted  price change. 
What  is the proper  interpretation  of the shifts  in coefficients  when the 
sample  period  is extended?  Any coefficient  in a time-series  regression  is 
sensitive  to conditions  inside the sample  period.  Thus it is not surprising 
that  an equation  estimated  for the relatively  placid  1954-71 period  misses 
some aspects  of the timing  of pricing  decisions  by firms  during  1971-76, 
9. The mean lag of 4.8 quarters in the 1954-71  equation seems unreasonably 
long. When that sample period is split in half, the mean lag falls to 2.9 quarters  for 
1954-62 but rises to 8.1 quarters  for 1963-71. A close examination  of the data leads 
me to suspect that erratic movements of the series on compensation per manhour 
(CMH) in the latter period forced the computer  to "stretch  out" the lags. The alter- 
native wage index, average hourly earnings (AHE),  moved more smoothly and 
actually is more successful as the wage variable  for the equation in column 5. It cuts 
the standard  error from 0.234 to 0.213, and the mean lag from 4.8 to 4.0 quarters. 
I now believe that, despite its narrower  scope, AHE is the preferable wage variable 
for price (as well as wage) equations, returning  to a judgment  reflected  in my 1971 
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a period that included  price and wage controls,  a tremendous  surge in 
materials  prices,  and  an  unprecedented  slump  in productivity. 
Structural  Wage  Equations 
Structural  wage  and  price  equations  suitable  for estimating  the surpris- 
ing aspects  of the 1971-76 inflation  are  contained  in a paper  that  I wrote 
in early 1971.10 While the specification  of the structural  price equations 
reported  in table 2 and figure  1 was altered  somewhat  in 1975 and thus 
incorporates  knowledge  of events  to that point, no such reevaluation  of 
the 1971 wage  equations  has yet been carried  out.1'  Thus  this section  on 
wage  behavior  in the last five years  can identify  genuine  "surprises"  rela- 
tive to 1971 expectations. 
The first  column  of table 3 presents  the relevant  statistics  of the "final" 
1971 wage equation.12  The dependent  variable  is the two-quarter  rate of 
change  in a private  hourly earnings  index, the AHE variable  mentioned 
above,  which  is adjusted  by the Bureau  of Labor  Statistics  to exclude  the 
effects  of changes  in overtime  and  of interindustry  employment  shifts,  and 
which  incorporates  as well an adjustment  to include  the effects  of changes 
in fringe  benefits  (including  employer  contributions  for social security). 
Coefficients  for two of the independent  variables  in the equations  are 
not listed  in table  3, the constant  term  and  the constrained  effect  of changes 
in the social security  tax rate. The first three listed independent  vari- 
ables are proxies  for labor market  tightness-unemployment  dispersion 
among  demographic  subgroups,  the "disguised  unemployment  rate"  (the 
difference  between  the actual  labor  force and its trend), and the "unem- 
ployment  rate of hours"  (the difference  between  private  hours  per week 
and its trend). The official  unemployment  rate does not appear  in the 
equation;  the three  labor market  variables  are all correlated  with it and 
incorporate  its influence.  Although  only current  values of the three  vari- 
ables  are  included  in the wage  equation,  each  of the three  reacts  to changes 
in output  with a differing  lag pattern,  allowing  output  changes  and thus 
10. "Inflation  in Recession and Recovery." 
11. Detailed comparisons of the performance  of the 1971 wage equations with 
alternative versions proposed by other authors are contained in Robert J. Gordon, 
"Wage-Price  Controls and the Shifting Phillips Curve,"  BPEA, 2:1972, pp. 385-421. 
12. This information is copied from "Inflation  in Recession and Recovery,"  table 
1, equation 11. Robert  J. Gordon  265 
changes  in labor  market  conditions  to influence  wages  with a distributed 
lag. 
Two price  variables  are  listed (lines 6 and 7). The first  is a distributed 
lag of past changes  in the personal  consumption  deflator,  with  lag weights 
obtained  from a separate  regression  of the nominal  interest  rate on past 
inflation.  The second is the difference  between  changes  in the "product 
price"  (nonfarm  deflator) and the consumption  deflator.  The final vari- 
able (line 9) is the rate  of change  in the employee-tax  variable,  the sum  of 
the effective  tax rate on personal  income and the employee's  effective 
social  security  tax rate.'3 
Data revisions  between 1971 and 1976 alter  the coefficients  and their 
statistical  significance,  as is evident  in comparing  column  1, which  is based 
on the original  data, and column  2, which is based on the most recently 
revised  data. Ironically,  the "natural  rate hypothesis,"  in the form of a 
coefficient  of unity  on price  inflation,  is vindicated  by the revisions  in the 
official  data. The unemployment-dispersion  variable  becomes insignifi- 
cant while the coefficient  on inflation  increases  in lines 6 and 7; as I 
showed  in 1972, the dispersion  variable  and  high coefficients  on inflation 
are substitute explanations  of  wage change in  the  1954-70  sample 
period.'4 
When the sample period is extended  by two quarters,  in column 3, 
coefficients  shift further  but the results are reasonably  satisfactory.  Al- 
though the  unemployment-dispersion  variable has  faded away, the 
coefficient  of the disguised-unemployment  variable  remains  significant  and 
that  of unemployment  of hours  is considerably  increased  and enhanced  in 
statistical  significance  as compared  with  column  1. The coefficients  on the 
price variables strongly indicate that wage change fully incorporates 
changes  in price inflation  and that it is influenced  by changes  in product 
prices,  not consumer  prices. 
13. The 1971 specification,  with the social security tax appearing  both as a con- 
straint  on the left-hand side of the equation and as part of the employee-tax  variable 
on the right-hand  side, allows measurement  error  to bias downward  the coefficient  on 
the employee-tax  variable. In columns 2 through 7 this bias is eliminated  by defining 
the employee-tax variable as the two-quarter  change in 1/(1  -  rp),  where rT  is the 
effective  personal income tax rate. This and the replacement  of the nonfarm deflator 
by the deflator for nonfood business product net of energy are the only changes in 
specification  in moving from column 1 to column 2. Each equation includes a con- 
stant term and a social security tax constraint,  not shown in table 3. 
14. See my "Wage-Price  Controls,"  figure 1, p. 402. !%Y~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~c  :F'@U : 
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As in the case of the structural  price equations,  the postsample  extrap- 
olation errors  of the wage equation  are vastly larger  than the in-sample 
standard  error (lines 12 and 13 of column  3).  Two separate  extrapola- 
tions are  performed;  the lower  figures  in lines 13 and 14 result  from  using 
the nonfarm  business  deflator  as the "product  price" while the upper 
figures  result  from  using  the deflator  of nonfood  business  product  net of 
energy.'5  The cumulative  overprediction  given in line 14 is much higher 
when  the nonfarm  deflator  is used. This is the first  indication  of a conclu- 
sion that  emerges  very  strongly  in this section:  none of the 1973-74 infla- 
tion in food and energy  prices "got into" wages, and all pre-1971 wage 
equations  that allow any influence  of food and energy  prices drastically 
overpredict  the cumulative  1971-76 wage  increase. 
Just as the postsample  extrapolations  of the structural  price equation 
were superior  when the sum of labor-cost  coefficients  was constrained  to 
be 1.0, the extrapolations  of the wage equation  improve  when the sum 
of the price coefficients  is constrained  to be 1.0. The constraint  is intro- 
duced by changing  the arrangement  of the price variables. Since the 
result in column 3 indicates that only the product price "matters"- 
since  the 1.085 coefficient  on the consumption  deflator  in line 6 is virtually 
cancelled  by the 0.974 coefficient  on "minus"  the consumption  deflator  in 
line 7-the  product  price is entered  directly  in line 8 with the sum of 
coefficients  constrained  to equal 1.0. Now the size of the coefficient  on 
line 7 measures  (with  reverse  sign) the separate  influence  of the consump- 
tion deflator;  a coefficient  of 0.0 would indicate  that only product  prices 
matter,  and a coefficient  of -1.0  that only consumption  prices  matter. 
The constrained  equation  in column 4 fits the sample  period slightly 
better than the unconstrained  version does, and achieves a marked  im- 
provement  in the postsample  root mean-square  error. The cumulative 
postsample  overprediction  is cut to slightly  more  than 1 percentage  point 
when  the deflator  for nonfood  business  product  net of energy  is used as the 
product  price.  Nevertheless,  the postsample  performance  is by no means 
perfect, as is clear  in figure  2 from a comparison  of the solid, "actual," 
line with the dotted  line representing  the postsample  predictions  of col- 
umn 4. The equation  underpredicts  in 1972 and 1973. Although the 
similar  underprediction  in the four quarters  prior  to controls  in 1970-71 
15. The coefficients  in columns 2 through  8 are based on the deflator  for nonfood 
business  product net of energy. Robert  J. Gordon  269 
complicates  the verdict,  the performance  suggests  that tlle controls  pro- 
gram  did not reduce  wage  change  at all;  beyond  that,  wage  change  during 
the controls  program  did not even reflect  the deceleration  of prices.  The 
other  major  error  in the extrapolation  is a substantial  overprediction  of 
wage  change  during  1975 and 1976. A possible  interpretation  of the pat- 
tern  of these  errors  is presented  below. 
The strong  evidence  that product  prices  and  not consumer  prices  mat- 
ter suggests  that the major  determinant  of wage behavior  is the demand 
for labor  by firms,  not the needs  of workers  or union  aggressiveness.  That, 
in turn,  raises  the question  of whether  wage changes  depend  basically  on 
demand  conditions  in the product  market  rather  than exclusively  in the 
labor  market. 
Considerable  experimentation  with  lag structures  suggests  that  the effect 
of the commodity  market  on wages  can  be represented  by a pair  of proxies 
for excess  demand:  ( 1  ) the gap  between  actual  and  potential  output,  and 
(2)  the first difference  in the gap (the same variable  used in the price 
equation)  .16  When  the  pair  of output-gap  variables  replaces  the three  labor 
market  variables  of the original  specification,  the standard  errors  of esti- 
mate improve  slightly (compare  columns  3 and 5). The same holds true 
for a comparison  of the respective  versions with constrained  price co- 
efficients  in columns  4 and 6. The postsample  performance  of the con- 
strained  output-gap  version in column 6 is markedly  better than that 
reported  in column  4 by the criteria  of both the root mean-square  error 
and the cumulative  error.  When  the product  price is represented  by the 
deflator  for nonfood  business  product  net of energy,  the output  equation 
in column  6 can track  cumulative  wage  change  between  1971 and 1976 to 
within  0.1 percent. 
The output-gap  equation  in column  6 is remarkable  in attributing  vir- 
tually all of the impact  of the demand  for commodities  on wages to the 
change  in the output  gap. The coefficient  on the level of the output  gap is 
16. The output gap is equal to potential output minus actual output, with the 
difference divided by potential output. The level of potential output is a trend that 
equals actual output when unemployment  equals the natural rate of unemployment. 
Details of the methodology for estimating the natural unemployment rate are con- 
tained in Robert J. Gordon, "Structural  Unemployment and the Productivity of 
Women,"  in Karl Brunner  and Allan H. Meltzer, eds., Stabilization  of the Domestic 
and International  Economy, Carnegie-Rochester  Conference Series on Public Policy, 
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so small,  and  so weak  statistically,  that  it plays  onily  a trivial  role, implying 
that  an  economy  with  output  gaps  of 6 percent  and -6  percent  would  have 
almost exactly  the same rates of wage inflation,  given the rate of price 
inflation.  This  implication  of the output-gap  version  in column  6 conflicts 
with  the  vast  body  of previous  research,  including  the original  specification 
in columns  1 and 4, in which  the dominant  labor market  variable  is dis- 
guised  unemployment,  which tends to be correlated  more with the level 
of total unemployment  than  with its rate  of change. 
Finally, in constructing  table 3, I extended  the sample  period of the 
wage  equations  to the end of 1976. Results  for the unconstrained  versions 
are shown  in columns  7 and 8. Dummy  variables  for the controls  are  in- 
cluded  in the equation  for the same  time  intervals  as in table  2, and  imply 
not only that controls in 1971-72  did not hold down wages, but that 
wages increased  more than would have been expected in light of the 
moderating  impact  of the controls  on price inflation.  The improvement 
in fit in the extended  version  with the original  specification  is evident  in 
the contrast  between  the dotted and dashed  lines in figure  2. At the cost 
of only a slight  deterioration  in the tracking  of wage  change  in 1969-71, 
the extended  equation  is able  to cut drastically  the overprediction  of wage 
change  in 1975. 
Other  than the inclusion  of dummy  variables,  the main difference  in 
the extended  equation  in column 8 is a marked  increase  in the absolute 
value of the coefficient  on the level of the output  gap. The recession  ap- 
pears  to have been more  effective  during  1975-76 in holding  down wage 
change  than  would  have  been predicted  from  the sample  period  ending  in 
1971:2. The output-gap  equations  estimated  for the 1954-71 period  tend 
to exhibit  a relatively  flat  short-run  Phillips  curve,  because  of the influence 
of the rapid  wage  change  during  the recession  of 1970-71. Equations  esti- 
mated  to the full 1954-76 period  display  a higher  coefficient  on the level 
of the output  gap,  reflecting  the  reduced  rates  of wage  change  in 1975-76. 
The same contrast  is evident  in a comparison  of the coefficient  on the 
unemployment  of hours  in columns  4 and 7, the two equations  that are 
plotted  in figure  2. Is it the 1970-71 period  that  should  be considered  the 
outlier,  or 1975-76? Some  previous  research  suggests  an unusual  spread 
in 1970-71  between union and nonunion  wage change which may be 
associated  with  the timing  of union  neg,otiations  over  the 1967-71 period. 
Based  on this  evidence,  I tend  to favor  the interpretation  that  the 1970-71 000 
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period  was unusual,  and hence to prefer  the coefficients  in the extended 
equations  in columns  7 and  8. 
Some authors  have developed models of wage-setting  behavior in 
which  wage  change  depends  not on price change,  as in table 3, but only 
on the past behavior  of wages. While it is plausible  to argue  that both 
firms  and  workers  base  wage  changes  on wage  changes  recently  granted  to 
comparable  employees  in other firms  or industries,  both theory and the 
data decisively  support  a role for price change.'7  When  a distributed  lag 
on past  changes  in wage  rates  is substituted  for price  change  in the 1954- 
71 period, using the specification  of column 5 in table 3, the sum of 
squared  residuals  triples. For the longer 1954-76  period, the sum of 
squared  residuals  rises by 59 percent.  Further,  the pattern  of residuals 
indicates  that  the "wage-wage"  version  cannot  explain  any of the acceler- 
ation  of wage change  between  1973 and 1974. 
Policy  Simulations 
A dynamic  simulation  of the wage and price equations,  which allows 
for the effects  of wages  on prices  and  prices  on wages,  provides  an assess- 
ment  of the inflationary  implications  of altermative  paths  of economic  re- 
covery  and  of the required  duration  of a "stable  prices  at any cost"  policy 
that prevents recovery and maintains today's output gap. 
Policy simulations  with a two-equation  wage-price  model have both 
disadvantages  and advantages  as compared to  simulations  using the 
large-scale  forecasting  models.  The  main  disadvantage  is that  the  specifica- 
tion must  be restricted  to rely (largely  if not entirely) on a single exoge- 
nous variable-for example,  the output  gap-which  "drives"  the simula- 
tion. Offsetting  advantages  are that the simulation  results  may be more 
easily studied,  interpreted,  and understood,  and that the equations  that 
underlie  the simulations  are similarly  "open  for inspection." 
The policy simulations  derive alternative  paths of inflation in the 
nonfood sector  net of energy  implied  by alternative  exogenous  paths of 
the output gap. Since relative  energy prices are likely to rise over the 
next few years, the corresponding  paths for the GNP deflator  would all 
lie above  that  presented  in figure  3. 
17. See particularly  Robert E. Hall, "The Process of Inflation  in the Labor Mar. 
ket," BPEA, 2:1974, pp. 343-93, and my criticisms  of that paper,  pp. 394-99. 00 
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Because  the  previous  analysis  leads  to the  conclusion  that  the extended- 
period  price  equation  contains  a more  plausible  lag pattern  on trend  unit 
labor  cost, and  that  the steeper  Phillips  curve  in the extended-period  wage 
equation  is likely  to be more  accurate,  the simulations  presented  here are 
based  on the price  equation  in table 2, column  7, and the wage equation 
in table 3, column  8. The wage equation  that uses the output  gap rather 
than  the  unemployment  variables  of the original  specification  is employed 
to avoid  the problem  of creating  equations  that  link those unemployment 
variables  to the output  gap. 
Tax rates were all assumed  to remain  unchanged  at their values in 
1976:4, and  the change  in the relative  prices  of capital  and consumption 
goods  was set equal  to zero in all simulations.  Simple  equations  were de- 
veloped  to relate  changes  in materials  prices and the change  in the pro- 
ductivity  deviation  to the change  in the output  gap. Further  adjustments 
were made  to ensure  that the inflation  rate would neither  accelerate  nor 
decelerate  when  the output  gap  was zero.  To obtain  this  result  in dynamic 
simulations,  it is not enough  to constrain  the sum  of coefficients  on wages 
in the price  equation,  and on prices  in the wage equation,  to be equal  to 
1.0. Three  other  important  restrictions  must  be imposed:  First,  the trend 
rate  of productivity  growth  in the price  equation  must  be set equal  to the 
constant  term  in the wage  equation.  This  switch,  from 1.96 to 2.13 percent 
annually,  is small enough to be acceptable  and within the range  of the 
standard  error  in the equation  originally  used  to estimate  the productivity 
trend.  Second,  the growth  rate of the wage variable  in the price  equation 
must equal that of the wage variable  in the wage equation.  Third,  there 
must  be no change  in relative  materials  prices. 
Figure 3 corresponds  to these assumptions  and displays  three com- 
binations  of inflation  and  unemployment.  Path A is an implausibly  rapid 
recovery  that reduces  the output  gap from  its 6.2 percent  rate at the end 
of 1976 to zero by 1978:1. At first inflation  is predicted  to slow down 
moderately,  benefitting  from the lagged  influence  of low rates of change 
in wages and prices  in 1976, but then an acceleration  begins. The "rate 
of change"  effects  of a rapidly  falling  output  gap push  inflation  close to 7 
percent  in late 1978, followed  by an adjustment  to the long-run  "steady 
state"  rate  of 6.4 percent. 
A slower  recovery,  path B, reaches a zero gap in 1980 (the quarter 
before  the next presidential  election), rather  than in early 1978. Slower 
growth  has both transitory  and permanent  benefits.  Inflation  is lower by Robert  J. Gordon  275 
as much  as 1.3 percenitage  points  at an annual  rate in late 1978, and the 
long-run  "steady  state"  rate  of inflation  is 0.4 point  slower."8 
Since  path  B corresponds  most closely  to the recovery  path apparently 
desired  by the Carter  administration,  this "optimistic"  simulation  con- 
flicts with the administration's  avowed aim of reducing  unemployment 
while simultaneously  achieving  a deceleration  of inflation  to 4 percent. 
Even on the optimistic  assumption  of zero change  in relative  energy  and 
food prices,  the administration's  policy goals are  inconsistent. 
The third  alternative  in figure  3, path  C, shows  the rate  of deceleration 
of inflation  that  would  obtain  if the output  gap were  held permanently  at 
6.2 percent.  The inflation  rate would fall rapidly  during  1977, reflecting 
the delayed  impact  of the lower-than-predicted  actual  rates  of wage and 
price change during  1976. Subsequently,  a further  modest  slowdown  of 
inflation  would occur, beginning  with a 0.24 percentage  point drop in 
the inflation  rate in 1978, widening  to a deceleration  of 0.36 percentage 
point per year in 1986. This turtle-like  deceleration  of inflation  reflects 
the extremely  weak effect of a high output gap on wage behavior,  and 
the absence  of any effect  of a maintained  gap on price  behavior. 
In my own judgment,  the assumptions  underlying  the simulations  re- 
flected  in the figure  lean toward  the optimistic  side. First,  as noted above, 
they ignore  the prospect  of rising  relative  prices  of energy  over the years 
ahead.  Second,  they assume  no upward  trend  in relative  materials  prices, 
in contrast  with the actually  observed  trend of 2.0 percent a year for 
1963-76  (adjusted  to a constant  output  gap). Third, they assume  that 
compensation  per manhour  and average  hourly earnings  will grow at 
equal rates,  when in fact the former  has outpaced  the latter  by 0.3 per- 
centage  point a year on average  since mid-1971. If that trend  were as- 
sumed to continue, it would put added upward  pressure  on the price 
equation  for any path of average  hourly  earnings  predicted  by the wage 
equation.  Alternative,  more pessimistic,  assumptions  could easily add 1 
to 2 points  to the inflation  rate  by 1980 and as much  as 3 to 4 points  by 
1986. 
18. As an example of a more optimistic conclusion, a "control  solution"  recently 
published  by Data Resources, Inc., predicted  that the economy could reach 5.5 per- 
cent unemployment in 1980, a path roughly equivalent to my path B, with only a 
5.4 percent change in the GNP deflator  in 1980. See Otto Eckstein and others, Eco- 
nomic Issues and Parameters of  the Next 4  Years (Data  Resources, Inc.,  1977), 
table 6, p. 30, solution "CONTROL1229." 276  Brookings  Papers  on Economic Activity, 1  :1977 
Conclusion 
All approaches  fail to explain  the increased  variance  of inflation  during 
1971-76 as compared  to the pre-1971 period.  But overall,  the cumula- 
tive amount  of inflation  since 1971 can  be explained-even overexplained 
-by  established  econometric  procedures.  Both the structural  price and 
the structural  wage equations  can track the cumulative  change in the 
prices  of nonfood  business  product  net of energy  and  in wages  to within  a 
percentage  point,  once they incorporate  the sensible  constraint  that sums 
of coefficients  of prices  on wages  and  wages  on prices  equal  unity. 
The  analysis  of this  paper  leads  to the  following  interesting  conclusions. 
First, the short-run  Phillips  curve  relating  wage change  to unemploy- 
ment or the output  gap may well be steeper  than implied  by equations 
estimated  for sample  periods  ending  in 1971. While this result  helps to 
explain  why wage changes  were so moderate  in 1976, it implies that a 
rapid  economic  recovery  may bring  about  a greater  acceleration  in infla- 
tion than  some commentators  appear  to anticipate. 
Second,  the speed of recovery  matters,  in both the price and the wage 
equations.  It is the rate of change  of the output  gap that influences  the 
rate  of change  of prices  relative  to wages,  and  there  is also a partial  impact 
from  the speed of the change  in output  in the output-gap  version  of the 
wage equations. 
Third,  the ability  of product  prices  and  the output  gap alone  to explain 
wage behavior  suggests  that the demand  for labor by firms  is the main 
determinant  of wages,  and  that  autonomous  actions  or reactions  by work- 
ers  have  little  impact. 
Fourth,  as in previous  papers,  I conclude  that price controls  worked 
temporarily,  with a decline  in the price  level followed  by a rebound,  but 
that  wage  controls  had  if anything  a perverse  effect.  Why  the effectiveness 
of the controls  program  should have been limited to prices is a puzzle 
that  others  may  be better  able  to answer.  The implications  for wage  guide- 
lines  or jawboning  are  not reassuring. 
Fifth, none of the increases  in food or oil prices  in 1973-74 appears 
to have  been  incorporated  into wages.  In the context  of my previous  study 
of supply  shocks, this implies that policymakers  could have stimulated 
nominal  income  growth  to accommodate  some of the effect of food and 
oil prices  without  setting  off an endless  inflationary  spiral.  But the strong Robert  J. Gordon  277 
demand  effects  exhibited  in the equations  of this paper  suggest  that such 
a policy  of accommodation  would  have substantially  lessened  the deceler- 
ation  of inflation  between  1974 and  1976.19 
Sixth,  perhaps  most  important,  the outlook  for inflation  is rather  grim. 
Despite  the  continuing  output  gap,  the statistical  evidence  presented  above 
indicates  that any further  deceleration  in inflation  is highly  unlikely.  On 
the contrary,  it points to the probability  of some acceleration  as the 
economy  continues  its recovery.  While  the extent  of that acceleration  will 
depend  on the speed  of the recovery,  inflation  rates  of 6 or 7 percent  seem 
likely  for the next several  years,  compared  with the 5 percent  rate  during 
1976. Any serious  effort  to eliminate  inflation  through  demand  restraint 
would  be exceedingly  costly;  a strategy  of maintaining  the  late 1976 output 
gap might  bring  the inflation  rate down  to 2 percent  by the mid-eighties, 
but only through  a loss of output that would substantially  exceed $1 
trillion. 
Finally,  as a corollary  to this unpleasant  verdict,  the recovery  itself is 
likely  to require  a maintained  growth  of monetary  aggregates  above  rates 
that now seem acceptable  to the Federal  Reserve,  in order  to finance  an 
annual  growth  of nominal gross national  product  of 12 or 13 percent 
during  the rest of the decade. How the makers  of monetary  policy will 
react  to this dilemma  remains  to be seen. 
Discussion 
SEVERAL participants  commented  on the substantial  differences  between 
the coefficients  in the price and wage equations  fitted  through  1971 and 
those  for the period  as a whole.  They  questioned  the stability  of the under- 
lying structure  in light of these changes.  George  Perry  noted, in particu- 
lar, the much greater  role played by the level of the output  gap in the 
full-period  estimate  of the wage equation.  Franco Modigliani  cautioned 
against  drawing  the inference  that consumer  prices  do not matter  on the 
19. A hypothetical accommodative  policy that maintained  the output gap at zero 
in 1974-76 would have caused substantial extra inflation, reaching a peak in mid- 
1975 of 3.8 percentage points over that which actually occurred, and then tapering 
off to an excess of 2.0 percentage  points in late 1976. This conclusion is based on a 
dynamic simulation  of the same equations as are used in figure 3. 278  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1977 
basis of revised data and updated  equations  when the earlier  evidence 
suggested  otherwise. 
Arthur  Okun  remarked  that  path  C in figure  3 implied  extremely  asym- 
metrical  effects of excess demand  and excess supply. According  to the 
simulation,  it takes  a 6 percent  GNP gap for a whole decade  to eliminate 
an inflation  rate  that  resulted  from  much  smaller  excesses  over  potential  in 
the past.  Yet there  is no nonlinearity  in the equations  used for that simu- 
lation.  Gordon  responded  that  the apparent  asymmetry  resulted  from the 
contribution  to inflation  in the past of variables  other than excess de- 
mand-particularly  tax rates  and materials  prices-which are artificially 
held constant  in the simulations  of figure  3. Perry  commented  that over 
the years  growing  awareness  of inflation  may  have caused  the price  effects 
on wages to rise, in line with Michael Wachter's  analysis  of a shifting 
Phillips  curve.  Okun  suggested  that any advocate  of extreme  demand  re- 
straint  would  have a far more optimistic  view than path C, relying  on a 
"hawkish"  policy  stance  to reverse  inflationary  expectations.  He reminded 
the group  that William  Fellner had developed  that line of argument  in 
detail. 
Pentti  Kouri  was somewhat  surprised  to see that such a small  role was 
assigned  to consumer  prices in U.S. wage behavior during the recent 
period,  unlike  other  industrial  countries.  In the United  Kingdom  and  Italy, 
in particular,  deteriorations  in the terms  of trade  had induced  wage de- 
mands  aimed  at sustaining  previous  real  wage  levels. Perry  recalled,  how- 
ever,  that in his research  on European  wage behavior  he had found that 
value-added  and  wage-wage  effects  dominated  those of consumer  prices. 
Modigliani  disagreed  with  Perry  over the importance  of consumer  prices, 
especially  in the case of Italian  wage behavior.  Wachter  suggested  that 
food and fuel inflation  might have ultimately  gotten into wages in the 
United States  if not for the severity  of the recent  recession.  He found it 
quite  plausible  that price  feedbacks  on wages interact  with demand  con- 
ditions. 
Edmund  Phelps  believed  that  the nonfood  nonfarm  deflator  may  have 
performed  better  than the consumer  price  index because  the former  is a 
proxy  for lagged  wage  changes.  He would  prefer  to see a lagged  wage  term 
used instead  of prices;  he felt that, on theoretical  grounds,  the appropri- 
ate variable  is the expected  rate of wage change, which should have a 
coefficient  of unity given labor demand  and supply. Gordon reported, 
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lagged  wages.  Christopher  Sims  expressed  some amusement  that the best 
wage  equation  had  no labor  market  variables  in it. This result  conformed 
with his belief that wage and price equations  cannot  be distinguished  as 
applying  to different  categories  of behavior.  It was preferable  to consider 
them as interesting  statistical  reduced-form  summaries  of the dynamic 
relationships  among  the  variables. 
Wachter  found it implausible  that disguised  unemployment,  which is 
composed  largely  of marginal  workers,  could  exert  the major  influence  on 
wage changes  attributed  to it by Gordon's  wage equation.  He also ob- 
served that the small demand effects in the early price equations meant 
that  together  the wage  and  price  equations  formed  an almost  purely  auto- 
regressive  system,  in which  prices  and  wages  fed upon each other  without 
being  influenced  significantly  by demand. 
Gordon  supported  Sims'  interpretation  that the wage and price equa- 
tions represented  reduced-form  summaries  of  dynamic relationships. 
Many different  variables  shared the major cyclical movements  of the 
sample  period,  preventing  statistical  discrimination  among  finely  differen- 
tiated hypotlleses.  As Gordon  saw Wachter's  criticism  of the disguised 
unemployment  variable,  it attempted  to place a structural  interpretation 
on a variable  that  simply  represented  a generalized  demand  effect  and  that 
performed  no better  or worse than the output  gap, an alternative  proxy. 
Gordon  concluded  that, even when the wage and price equations  were 
viewed as reduced  forms, several  conclusions  emerged  strongly,  particu- 
larly the important  role of inertia  in the wage-price  process, and of the 
rate of change of output. On the other hand, no confidence  could be 
placed  on the impact  of the level of output  without  an informed  judgment 
on unusual  aspects  of the 1970 and 1973-75 recessions. 